To SETTILEMENT CLASSES AND BEYOND: A PRIMER ON
PROPOSED METHODS FOR FEDERALIZING MASS TORT
LITIGATION

INTRODUCTION

Recent' federal court decisions ordering the decertification of
nationwide class action suits2 highlight the need to reevaluate the
tools in the complex litigation toolbox.' Current law and judicial resources, as presently utilized, do not provide an adequate or efficient
method for managing the prolific number of mass tort or mass
products liability actions brought in federal courts.: Reform of federal complex litigation procedures must therefore be devised and
implemented, not simply pondered and relegated to the world of

"Recent" refers to decisions that have been handed down within the
past
three years.
2 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct 2231, 2252 (1997); Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996); Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 635 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nora. Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 117 S. Ct 2231, 2252 (1997); In reAmerican Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069,
1090 (6th Cir. 1996); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995); In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184
(1995).
3 See Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of Federalization,44
DEPAUL L. Rav. 755, 762 (1995) (observing that "[e]xisting federal rules and procedures are inadequate to the tasks of dealing with mass tort litigation, a problem
compounded by the lack of unified, governing, substantive tort law.").
Throughout this Note, unless otherwise indicated, "mass tort" and "mass
product liability" actions will refer to those tort actions that do not include single
mass accident actions such as aircraft disasters. Rather, the terms will refer to actions involving multiple litigants in various parts of the nation who were allegedly
injured by the same product or type of product. These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this Note.
See generally Mullenix, supra note 3 (discussing the inefficiency of the federal
courts in handling mass tort litigation). Professor Mullenix comments that mass
tort litigation not only challenges the competency of federal and state courts "but
also confounds jurisprudential theory." Id. at 757. Professor Mullenix also suggests
that not only are most nationwide mass tort actions already in federal court, but the
actions "have been and will continue to be handled ineffectually until Congress
federalizes mass tort law." Id. at 762.
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esoteric discussions and law review pages.8 This Note will examine
the merits and blemishes of proposed solutions to cure the problems
encountered when federal courtjudges are confronted with diversity
cases 7 involving (1) one product," (2) thousands of plaintiffs located
in numerous states throughout the nation, 9 and (3) several competing state choice of law provisions."
6 See id. at 762. The reader will kindly note the irony in this statement. This
Note, like most others written on federal substantive law and federal choice of law
provisions, is appearing in a scholarly publication.
7 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West Supp. 1997). Section
1332 states in part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States.
Id. This Note will be limited in scope to mass tort cases currently brought in federal
courts under the provisions of § 1332.
One of the solutions proposed by this Note would allow bringing a mass products liability action in federal district court as a federal question under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1994). Section 1331 gives "[t]he district courts... original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." Id. Some legal scholars suggest that the Supreme Court has already acknowledged a certain degree of federalization for mass tort litigation. See Mullenix,
supra note 3, at 762 n.35 (commenting that in American Nat'i Red Cross v. S.G. &?
A.E., 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992), the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "sue and be
sued" language contained in the Red Cross charter conferred federal question jurisdiction over AIDS cases).
8 See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
752 (5th Cir. 1997)
(cigarettes). "One product" refers to one product group such as cigarettes, asbestos,
or penile prostheses. It does not refer to simply one product item.
See id. at 737. The class in Castanowas comprised of "all nicotine-dependent
persons in the United States... who have purchased and smoked cigarettes manufactured by the defendant." Id. These individuals are in essence one plaintiff because all complainants have allegedly suffered the same or a similar amount of
harm from a product manufactured by one defendant or a group of similarly situated defendants. It is only by virtue of the plaintiffs' various residences scattered
throughout the United States that differing, and even opposing, states' tort laws influx the action. Indeed, it is arguably this aspect of the adversarial action that gives
complex litigation its name.
10See EUGENE F. ScoLEs & PETER HAY, CONFLICTS OF LAws 5 (2d ed. 1992).
Choice of law provisions mandate which state's law should be used when determining the outcome of a case involving the interests of more than one jurisdiction. See
id. These provisions have been chiefly characterized as substantive in form for purposes of whether federal or state law applies under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). See infra note 99 and accompanying text. Choice of law provisions,
however, contain inherently procedural qualities. See Larry Kramer, Choice ofLaw in
Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547, 568 (1996). Professor Kramer notes that
the procedural quality of choice of law is a "background assumption" that has never
been explained. See id. According to Professor Kramer, choosing the applicable law
is an inquiry distinct from applying the chosen law. See id. Professor Kramer comments that the determination of the appropriate governing law is a threshold inquiry. See id. Therefore, choice of law is bundled with other procedural matters
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Part I of this Note will briefly examine the common thread linking recent decertification decisions issued in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor," Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,' 2 Georgine v. Amchem Prod-

ucts, Inc.,'5 In re American Medical Systems, Inc.,4 In re General Motors
Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation," and In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.6 Part I will then suggest that, in light of
these decisions, past proposals for a substantive federal tort law and a
federal choice of law provision, applicable to both federal and state
courts, must be reevaluated.
Part II will discuss one possible solution for the efficient handling of complex tort litigation: an amendment to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 23)." In 1996, the Advisory
such as venue, personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and service of
process, which are considered early in the litigation. See id. Professor Kramer, however, ultimately concludes "that choice of law is not a matter of procedure. It is, in
fact, as substantive as it gets." Id. at 569.
11 117S. Ct. 2231 (1997)
12 84 F.3d 784 (5th Cir. 1996).
is 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub noa. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,

117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
14 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
15 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
16 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. CL 184 (1995).
17 FED. R. CIrv. P. 23. Rule 23 establishes the
requirements for class action suits
in federal court. See id. Rule 23 reads in part
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)
the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive
of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interest; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
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Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure drafted an
amendment to Rule 23 that specifically permitted the inclusion of
settlement classes.' 8 The proposed amendment would have allowed
certification of plaintiff classes solely for the purpose of settlement.'9
Part II will examine the plausibility that this type of amendment will

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
Id.
The class action is an exception to the traditional rule that individuals who
were not parties to a case are not bound by thejudgment. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 41 (1940). In essence, the class action "was an invention of equity mothered by the practical necessity of providing a procedural device so that mere numbers would not disable large groups of individuals, united in interest, from enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them immunity from their equitable wrongs."
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948) (citation
omitted).
18

See

COMMrITEE ON RuLEs OF PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE

OF THE JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF APPELLATE, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 19, 21 (1996)

[hereinafter COMMrrrF-E ON RULES OF PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE] (on file with the Seton Hall Law Review). After extensive hearings on the proposed amendment, however, the Committee decided not to forward the amendment for Congress's approval. See Interview with Mark Syska, Attorney Advisor for the Rules Committee
Support Office, Administrative Office of the United States Courts in Rules Committee Support (Jan. 16, 1998).
9 See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (Proposed Amendment 1996). Proposed
Rule 23(b) (4)
reads:
[Tihe parties to a settlement request certification under subdivision
(b) (3) for purposes of settlement, even though the requirements of
subdivision (b) (3) might not be met for purposes of trial.
Id.
The settlement class tool would allow the courts to postpone formal class certification until after the parties involved have reached a settlement. See, e.g.,
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 625 n.9 (3d Cir. 1996). After certifying the class for the sole purpose of furthering the settlement, the court would then
notify class members of the commencement of the class action and the settlement
agreement. See id. If the settlement were to fall apart, the defendant would still be
able to challenge class certification because the class was conditionally certified for

settlement purposes only. See id.
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provide an efficient and fair, alternative forum for mass tort plaintiffs.
Part III will explore the potential for federal choice of law provisions as an alternative solution. 20 A federal choice of law rule could
streamline mass tort litigation by eliminating the hours spent deciphering which choice of law analysis applies to each plaintiff.2' Part
III will then examine whether such a rule should be enacted by Congress or the judiciary. If choice of law rules are substantive, then the
provision should be enacted by a congressional statute.n If, however,
choice of law is procedural, under the Rules Enabling Act2 the judiciary could promulgate the provision.2 4
Part V will analyze the possibility of substantive federal tort law.
Part V will also discuss whether federal tort law should be created
from judicial common law precedents or congressional statutory reforms. 2' This discussion will address the tension between the judicial
26

creation of federal common law in this area and the Erie doctrine.
20

See generally Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation:

Some PreliminaryThoughts, 10 REv. LIG. 309 (1991) (discussing the advantages and
necessity of a federal choice of law provision governing mass torts). Essentially,
choice of lawjurisprudence is the study of why and when a foreign state law is applicable to a particular cause of action. See ScoI.Es & HAY, supra note 10, at 5. A court
employs choice of law analysis when determining which state's substantive law
should govern a diversity action brought in federal court. See generally P. John
Kozyris, The Conflicts Provisions of the ALI's Complex Litigation Project: A Glass Half
Full?, 54 LA. L. REv. 953 (1994) (analyzing the merits and problems of the American Law Institute's proposed conflicts of law provisions).
1 See Linda S. Mullenix, FederalizingChoice of Law
for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 1623, 1625 (1992) (commenting that choice of law jurisprudence is a discipline "mired in sophistry and obfuscation").
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). The Rules Enabling Act provides in pertinent
part:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive

right.
Id. Federal legislation is required for substantive changes because the Rules Enabling Act limits the judiciary to enacting procedural reform. See id. Additionally,
the United States Constitution bestows upon Congress, not the courts, the power to
make law. See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 1 (declaring that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States ... ."). It is the judiciary's role subsequently to interpret that law. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (declaring that "[ilt is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
23 28 U.S.C. §
2072.
24
25

See id.

See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1
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In conclusion, Part V will suggest that reform via congressional
enactment of substantive mass tort legislation is the answer. Congress, however, has been uneasy about regulating in areas traditionally deemed to be of local state concern." Likewise, in light of Erie
Railroadv. Tompkins, 8 judicial adoption of common law in this area is
unlikely.n Therefore, because the Supreme Court has not indicated
a reconsideration of Erie,'3and Congress is unwilling to legislate in
this area, the settlement class provision proposed, but ultimately
withdrawn, by the Advisory Committee may be the best available
method for addressing the imminent need for efficient judicial
management of complex mass tort cases.' In effect, the specific in(West 1997); see also infra note 134 (discussing the Act). Statutory reform could be
accomplished in a manner similar to that of the Privates Securities Litigation Reform Act. In an effort to regulate class action suits brought in the area of private
securities, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which
provided the procedural methods for bringing this type of suit in federal court. See
15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1. For example, the Act provides, inter alia, that (1) a plaintiff
wishing to serve as a class representative must file a sworn certification, (2) notice
must be given to class members within 20 days of the filing of the class action complaint, (3) court-awarded attorney fees and expenses cannot "exceed a reasonable
percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to
the class," (4) notice regarding settlements and proposed settlements must include
the amount to be distributed to class members, the potential outcome of the case,
and the name, telephone number, and address of at least one of the representatives' attorneys, and (5) all discovery will be stayed during the pendency of motions
to dismiss, unless undue prejudice would result to the party requesting. See id.
See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 805, 812-19,
832-42 (1989) (suggesting that the Erie doctrine does not preclude all federal common law and is not an insurmountable obstacle to creating federal substantive law).
The Erie doctrine states that federal courts should not create general federal common law. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The doctrine also declares that, unless an action is predicated on the United States Constitution or a
proper act of Congress, state law is to be applied to the case even though the case is
brought in federal court. See id. The application of state substantive law limits the
federal courts to the role of an alternative forum for diversity cases as opposed to an
alternative system of substantive law. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1302 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
See Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. LJ.
271, 281 & n.67 (1996) (noting that Congress is unlikely to support a federal substantive mass tort law because tort law is an area "historically governed by state
law"); Mullenix, supra note 3, at 779 (positing that tort law is quintessentially state
common law).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See id. at 78. In Erie, the Supreme Court declared that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law and rules of the domicile
state. See id.
so See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996) (relying
heavily on Erie for the proposition that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply
the substantive law, including the right to ajury trial, of the states in which they sit).
31 See Mullenix, supra note 3, at 756 (noting that mass tort litigation is flooding
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clusion of settlement classes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
would both circumvent choice of law complexities and bypass the
need for federal substantive law reform.3 2
I.

RECENT DECERTIFICATION DECISIONS DEMONSTRATE THE NEED
FOR RETHINKING THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION

In recent years, several cases illustrate a trend towards decertifying mass tort plaintiff classes because of the problems associated with
applying varying state laws and the burdens of choice of law analysis." One of the first cases in this current trend was In re RhonePoulene Rorer Inc.,34 decided in 1995.-5 In Rhone-Poulene, Chief Judge
Posner, writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, decertified a plaintiff class comprised of hemophiliacs
infected with HIV-contaminated blood.3 Although an economic
analysis of the class action suit predicated the thrust of the holding,"'
Chief Judge Posner indicated primary concern with the creation of
an appropriate jury instruction.- The chief judge doubted the feasibility of issuing a jury instruction that could effectively merge the
negligence standards of every state in the nation and the District of
Columbia."9
the federal dockets and new types of mass tort litigation arise every few months, "but
nothing has been done" to handle the mass tort litigation crisis confronting the
federal system).
32 See COMMITTEE ON RuLES OF PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 18,
at 34, 85.
33 See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 784, 739-43, 749-50 (5th Cir.
1996); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub
nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997); In re American
Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996); In re General Motors Corp. PickUp Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Iudg., 55 F.3d 768, 788 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 88 (1995); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.8d 1298, 1800-02 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
m 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
s5 See id. at 1800.
36 See id. at 1295, 1804. HIV is the acronym for
the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus. See id. at 1295. Plaintiffs alleged that they were infected with HIVcontaminated blood solids distributed by several drug companies. See id. The
named pharmaceutical companies included Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., Armour
Pharmaceutical Corp., Miles Inc., Baxter Healthcare Corp., and Alpha Therapeutic
CoT. See id. at 1294.
See id. at 1299-1800 (expressing concern with "forcing the defendants to stake
their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by the fear of the
risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability").
s, See id. at 1800.
s9 See id. ChiefJudge Posner coined the term "esperanto" to describe the ad hoc
nature of this type ofjury instruction. See id. The chiefjudge described the hypothetical scenario as follows: a single jury would be instructed with law that is not the
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In the same year the Seventh Circuit decided Rhone-Poulenc, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re General
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation" addressed
the propriety of certifying a plaintiff settlement class. 4' In General
Motors, owners of defectively designed GMC pick-up trucks equipped
with side-saddle fuel tanks reached a settlement with General Motors
Corporation that would give each class member a $1000 coupon redeemable towards the purchase of a new GMC or Chevy truck.42 The
district court approved the settlement and provisionally certified the
plaintiff class. In doing so, the district court did not evaluate Rule
23 (a) and (b) criteria."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the certification was improper based on the facts
presented and remanded the case to the district court for a finding
law of any jurisdiction. See id. This group of six persons would then ultimately decide whether an industry is negligent based on an ad hoc instruction that attempts
to merge approximately 51 different standards for negligence. See id. The potential
result could be that one group, comprised of six individuals, will "hurl the industry
into bankruptcy." Id. Chief Judge Posner probably chose the term "esperanto" to
describe the ad hoc nature of the instruction because the term esperanto refers to
artificial language created by combining commonly known words of various European languages. See WEasmi's THI, DNEw IwTRA-Tno
DicnoNRav 776 (1993).
The chief judge did, however, remark that some generality of negligence law
could probably be gleaned. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.8d at 1300. In essence, the
judge stated that "[niegligence is a failure to take due care, and due care a function
of the probability and magnitude of an accident and the costs of avoiding it." Id.
The Seventh Circuit further hypothesized that state tort law variations might not
ultimately affect the outcome of the action. See id.
The court, however, doubted the applicability of this generalized concept because the HIV-infected plaintiffs proceeded on a "serendipity" theory. See id. The
"serendipity" theory proffered by the plaintiff class argued that the defendants
would be liable to the hemophiliac plaintiffs if the defendants did not adequately
protect blood product recipients from the risk of contracting Hepatitis B. See id. at
1301. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants should be responsible for all consequences, including risks then unknown, resulting from the infected blood products if the defendants did not take proper measures to guard against Hepatitis B
infection. See id.
Moreover, an "esperanto" jury instruction like that suggested in Rhone-Poulenc
possibly violates the general proposition of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. See 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938). In Erie, the Court declared that lower federal courts do not possess
the power to create general common law. See id. But see infra notes 127-67 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of federal mass tort law as a possible
solution to the problems accompanying mass products liability litigation.
40 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 88
(1995).
41
2Se
4See

44

See id. at 777.
i. at 779, 780.
id. at 781.

Seeid.
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of whether Rule 23 criteria was satisfied. 45 The court cited the lack of
commonality and typicality among proposed plaintiff settlement
class members as the reasons for vacating the provisional certification. Although the court acknowledged that settlement classes may
rid the courts of the litigation "albatrosses" that are characteristic of
many mass tort actions, the Third Circuit was unwilling to transform
federal courts into mediation forums.47 The court ultimately concluded that "a class is a class is a class," and that a settlement class,
like all classes certified under Rule 23, must satisfy all, not just some,
of the requirements of the rule. 8
Approximately one year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided In re American Medical Systems,
Inc. In American Medical Systems, the Sixth Circuit also addressed the
issue of certifying a plaintiff settlement class.m The court of appeals
decertified the proposed plaintiff settlement class comprised of all
United States residents implanted with defective or malfunctioning
inflatable penile prostheses that were manufactured, developed, or
sold by American Medical Systems, Inc.5 ' Although the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the numerosity prerequisite of Rule 23 was satisfied,
45 See id. at 823.

46 See GeneralMotors, 55 F.3d at 800. The court noted that the record was devoid

of the facts necessary to make a finding of commonality and typicality. See id. The
court also commented that varying defenses might prevent the commonality and
typicality requirements from being satisfied. See id.
Although the Third Circuit vacated the district court's provisional certification,
the court did note that
the cases that make the settlement class device appear most useful are
cases presenting the most unwieldy substantive and procedural issues,
i.e., those diversity cases in which plaintiffs from many states are confronted with differing defenses, differing statutes of limitations,
etc.-precisely those cases that stretch the Rule to its outer-most limits.
Id. at 799.
47 See id. at 799. The Third Circuit voiced concern that if the primary purpose
and function of the settlement class is to ease the court's docket, a mediation forum
would result. See id. The court posited that the resulting transformation of a federal court into a mediation arena is inconsistent with the federal courts' mission
and limited resources. See id. Indeed, under the United States Constitution, federal courts are limited to hearing actual cases or controversies. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2. The text of Article M, § 2 reads in part: 'The judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution... [and] to Controversies ... between Citizens of different States...." Id.
GeneralMotors, 55 F.3d at 799-800.
49 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
so See id. at 1078-79.
51 See id. at 1077,
1090.
52

See id. at 1079-80.
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the court decided that common questions of law or fact did not predominate the action to such an extent that warranted class certification." Among the court's reasons for decertifying the plaintiff class
was the difficulty of providing an appropriate jury instruction on
negligence." According to the court of appeals, "if more than a few
of the laws of the fifty states differ, the district judge would face an
impossible task of instructing ajury on the relevant law."55
Less than six months later, and for the second time in one
year,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Georgine v. Amchem Products, IncY was again confronted with the propriety of certifying a plaintiff settlement class for an action that could
not be litigated." The class action in Georgine consisted of approximately two hundred fifty thousand to two million people who were
exposed to asbestos products over the prior twenty years.59 The court
of appeals concluded that the complexity of the plaintiff class prevented it from satisfying Rule 23 requirements.Y In reaching this
conclusion, the court limited the inquiry to whether the settlement
See id. at 1081. In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit stated that individual complications and issues of causation, reliance, and damages may vary to
such an extent that any commonality existing among plaintiff class members and
claims would be obscured. See id.
5

54

See id. at 1085.

55 American Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1085.
See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995). In GeneralMotors, the court of
appeals confronted the propriety of certifying a settlement class. See id. at 777. The
court not only vacated the district court's provisional certification of the plaintiff
class, but also commented that varying state law requirements for proof of individualized reliance in misrepresentation actions potentially posed a substantial barrier
concerning class-wide liability. See id. at 783, 815, 822-23; see also supra notes 40-48
and accompanying text (discussing GeneralMotors).
57 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
See id. at 618. The Third Circuit noted that among the obstacles defeating
commonality were the radically different legal and factual issues in each plaintiff's
claim. See id. The court further observed that these differences, coupled with
choice of law considerations, eclipsed any commonality among the plaintiff class.
See id.
59 See id. at 617.
60 See id. at 618, 626-35. Although the court agreed that the numerosity requirement was easily satisfied because the plaintiff class could potentially number in
the millions, the court also noted that the class members' claims varied widely in
character because plaintiffs were exposed to different amounts of asbestos in different ways for different periods of time. See id. at 626. The court also commented
that an individualized choice of law analysis must be applied to each plaintiff's
claim. See id. at 627. Varying state law treatment of each plaintiffs claim and differing governing standards concerning the possibility of future injury resulted in a colossal number of uncommon issues. See id.

550

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:540

class could pass muster as a litigation class.6 ' The court declared that
the district court's certification could not be justified because choice
of law difficulties
magnified the different legal and factual issues of
62
each plaintiff.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Castant v. American Tobacco Co.63 confronted the problems of varying
state torts laws in a class action.6 ' In Castano, the Fifth Circuit decertified the largest nationwide plaintiff class in the federal courts to
date.6" The Castano class members sought compensation from tobacco companies for injury caused by nicotine addiction.' Among
the reasons expounded by the Fifth Circuit for decertification was
that variations in state torts laws might overwhelm any issues of
common fact shared by the proposed plaintiff class. 7 The court of
See id. at 624. According to the Third Circuit, the requirements of Rule 23 are
generally applicable and a lower standard should not be used in the context of settlement classes. See id. at 624, 625. After evaluating each of the criteria required by
Rule 23(a) and (b), the Third Circuit then decertified the plaintiff class. See id. at
635.
62 See id. at 618. After commenting that each plaintiff's claim would
have to be
analyzed under a different choice of law analysis, the court opined that varying state
law treatment of issues, such as causation, statutes of limitations, comparative and
contributory negligence, viability of future claims, and the type of proof required to
prove exposure to asbestos, as well as the causes of action for medical monitoring,
fear of future injury, and increased risk of cancer, compounded the disparate legal
and factual issues confronting the court. See id. at 627. The Third Circuit did, however, commend both the parties and the trial court for crafting a "brilliant partial
solution to the scourge of asbestos that has heretofore defied global management in
anyvenue." Id. at 617.
84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 739-43.
See id. at 737. The class was comprised of "all nicotine-dependent persons in
the United States[,] ... the estates, representatives, and administrators of these
nicotine dependent cigarette smokers, and the spouses, children, relatives and
'significant others' of these nicotine-dependent cigarette smokers." Id.
61

SSeeid.
67 See id. at 739-40, 741-43.

The Fifth Circuit commented that state law treatment of the issues of fraud, negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, consumer
protection, and intentional tort differed to such an extent that these variations
would defeat any predominating factors of the multistate class action. See id. at 739,
740, 742. The plaintiff class failed to reassure the court of appeals that variations in
state tort law would not overwhelm any issues of common fact shared by the class
members. See id. at 743. The Fifth Circuit was unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' survey
that a few state courts had granted certification to plaintiff classes alleging consumer fraud. See id. According to the Fifth Circuit, the survey provided by plaintiffs
gave "short shrift" to complications that may arise from state law variations on the
many issues underlying the claim. See id. at 742. Rather than providing the court
with a meaningful discussion of state law treatment on the issues of products liability, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress, affirmative defenses, and punitive damages, plaintiffs submitted a sample phase I jury-verdict form, a survey of
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appeals explained that the different factual circumstances of class
members were substantial and, as such, would directly impact the
application of legal rules that vary from state to state." The court rejected the assertion of the plaintiffs that the high costs of litigating
individual actions against the tobacco industry and the unlikelihood
of.success justified class certification. 9 In conclusion, the court addressed the issue of choice of law and opined that individual trials, as
opposed to a70 class action, could better address the choice of law
complexities.
consumer fraud class action suits that merely quoted the class certification decisions
of a few state courts, and a survey of the law of punitive damages that only covered
the punitive damages laws of the defendants' home states. See id. at 743. The court
commented that these surveys and accompanying documents provided, at best, a
cursory glance of state law variations and provided no critical analysis of how state
law variations might affect any predominance attendant to the proposed class. See
id.
Some scholars, however, argue that any true difference between state negligence and strict liability law is minimal. See Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper
FederalRok in American Tort Law, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 917, 927 (1997) (recognizing that
although some differences exist "around the edges," current state tort laws are essentially the same in products liability actions). In fact, the basic elements for negligence and strict liability in tort remain constant throughout this nation: duty,
breach, causation, and damages. SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAw OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
While the basic elements of a negligence claim may be constant, mitigating factors
such as contributory negligence and comparative fault do vary widely from state to
state. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 1987) (completely precluding recovery once ajury determines that the plaintiff is responsible for more than 50% of
the injuries incurred) with N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1997) (stating that a
plaintiff in New York, a true comparative faultjurisdiction, can recover from the defendant even if the plaintiff is 95% responsible for plaintiff's injuries).
See Castano, 84 F.3d at 742 n.15. The different factual circumstances of class
members included the varying amounts of nicotine to which members were exposed during various periods of time by different tobacco products, the knowledge
of class members about the effects of smoking, and their reasons for beginning to
smoke. See id.
69 See id. at 747 n.25 (declaring that class certification
cannot be granted simply
because a plaintiff continuously loses at trial).
70 See id. at 749-50. The court instructed that prior to certification the court
must determine whether state law variations defeat predominance. See id. at 750.
The sheer complexity of this inquiry alone, the court posited, justified the need for
individual trials instead of one multistate class action suit. See id. The court observed that plaintiffs espoused eight different theories of liability from fifty different
states. See id. Although acknowledging that parsing through the choice of law
complexities would not be impossible, the court deduced that the degree of choice
of law complexity made individual state court trials a more attractive alternative to
one federal class action suit. See id. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit remarked that
state courts are more likely to be adept at addressing tort claims that have not yet
matured; thus, the need for a federal "esperanto" jury instruction would be obviated. See id.; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining an
"esperanto" jury instruction).
In concluding that the nationwide nicotine-
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The need for mass tort litigation reform culminated with the
Supreme Court decision in Amehem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.' In Amchem, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that the proposed
settlement class did not meet current Rule 23 certification requirements." The Court reasoned, inter alia, that the settlement class did
not meet Rule 23(b)(3) requirements of commonality because the
varying degrees of exposure to asbestos among the plaintiff class
members, combined with the differences in state law, defeated
commonality."
Choice of law complexities and the applicability of varying state
substantive laws have plagued mass tort actions for years.74 Courts
have frequently cited to problems with current substantive law and
procedural rules as reasons for decertifying a plaintiff class" or denying certification to a provisional settlement class. 76 The situation
must not only be addressed now, but must also be resolved.
II. AMENDING RULE 23 EXPRESSLY TO PERMIT THE CERTIFICATION OF
SETTLEMENT CLASSES THAT OTHERWISE DO NOT MEET CURRENT
RULE 23 CRITERIA FOR CLASSES CREATED IN ANTICIPATION OF
LITIGATION

In light of the demands imposed on federal courts 77 by the increased number of mass tort actions filed,78 the Advisory Committee
dependent class must be decertified, the court commented that "[the collective
wisdom of individual juries is necessary before this court commits the fate of an entire industry... to a singlejury." Castano,84 F.3d at 752.
71 117 S. Ct 2231
(1997).
72 See id. at 2237; see also supra notes 56-62 and accompanying
text (discussing
the Third Circuit opinion). Although the Supreme Court found that the proposed
settlement class did not meet the mandates of Rule 23, the Court rejected the Third
Circuit's opinion that the criteria of Rules 23(a) and (b) (3) must be examined
from a litigious viewpoint. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248. The Court commented
that in analyzing the propriety of class certification in accordance with Rule 23, the
proposed settlement is a relevant, but not overriding factor. See id. The Supreme
Court decided, however, that the Third Circuit's conclusion was not erroneous because the appellate court did consider the settlement when evaluating class certification criteria. See id.
73 See id. at
2250.
74 See Mullenix, supra note 3, at 781-82,
789.
75 See, e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at
742 n.15.
76 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
Liab.
Liti., 55 F.3d 768,800 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
See, e.g., id. at 779, 783. Mass tort actions impose a heavy demand on federal
courts because such actions not only involve thousands of plaintiffs scattered
throughout the nation, but also involve many variations in potentially applicable
state substantive law. See id.
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to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Committee) embarked on a
long journey to study, and possibly revise, Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."' Among the Committee's most significant
and hotly debated proposed amendments was the addition of Rule
23(b)(4). 80 According to the Committee, proposed Rule 23(b)(4)
was drafted to quell disagreement among lower federal courts regarding the propriety of certifying a class for purposes of reaching a
settlement when that same class could not be certified for purposes
of trial.8
Consequently, under the language of proposed Rule
78

See Mullenix, supra note 3, at 786. According to the Administrative Office of

the United States Courts, the federal courts saw a 125% increase in the number of
products liability actions filed nationwide within the 12-month period ending
March 31, 1995. See Brief for Petitioners at 73 n.17, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997) (No. 96-270). The prolific number of mass tort cases
brought in federal court has resulted in the de facto federalization of mass tort litigation. See Mullenix, supranote 3, at 786.
79

See ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE U.S.

COURTS,

PRELIMINARY

DRAFT OF

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1996)
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS] (on file with the Seton
Hall Law Review). After an in-depth study of Rule 23 and the demands and difficulties presented by mass tort litigation, the Committee decided that it would be premature to undertake a revision of Rule 23. See id. Revision would be premature,
the Committee reasoned, because the area of mass tort litigation is constantly undergoing rapid and continuing developments. See id.
This conclusion has proven all too truthful. For example, since the Committee
first undertook the study of Rule 23 in 1991, the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have addressed the issue whether a plaintiff class could be certified solely for
purposes of settlement. See, e.g., Amchem, 117 S.Ct. at 2237; Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 2237 (1997); GeneralMotors, 55 F.3d at 777. The federal
courts have also made landmark decisions in the areas of tobacco and asbestos class
action litigation. See Amchen; 117 S.Ct. at 2237 (holding that a settlement class
comprised of a nationwide class of plaintiffs who were either exposed to asbestos, or
had a spouse or family member exposed to asbestos, did not meet current Rule 23
criteria); Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. 2113, 2239, 2252
(1997) (holding that railroad workers exposed to asbestos cannot recover under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act until symptoms of injury are manifested); Castano
v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that issues
concerning nicotine addiction would be better addressed by individual trials than
by one nationwide class action).
so See Eric D. Green, What Will We Do IWhen Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in
Bunches: BringingRule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 17831801 (1997) (highlighting the views of proponents and opponents of proposed
Rule 23(b)(4)). See also supra note 19 for the language of the proposed settlement
class amendment.
81 See COMMITTEE ON RuiEs OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 18, at 51. As
Rule 23 currently reads, settlement classes are neither specifically authorized nor
specifically precluded from the certification process. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23. This notable lack of direction has resulted in conflicting opinions among lower federal
courts regarding the propriety of certifying settlement classes. See, e.g., Georgine, 83
F.3d at 617 (vacating the district court's certification of the settlement class); General
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23(b) (4), class certification requirements would be evaluated from
the perspective of a settlement, not a litigious, action.8
In drafting the settlement class provision, the Committee explained that settlement classes are the superior method for creating
comprehensive solutions to the large-scale problems of class actions
that are compounded by traditional adversarial litigation." This reaMotors, 55 F.3d at 777 (vacating the district court's approval of a settlement following the district court's certification of a settlement class).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (Proposed Amendment 1996); see also supra note 19
(discussing the language of proposed Rule 23(b) (4)). Indeed, Patrick Higginbotham, Chair for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, commented that the
proposed amendment to Rule 23 would allow certification of a settlement class even
when that same class could not be certified for litigation purposes. See COMMrlTEE
ON RuLys OF PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 18, at 21. Although all the prerequisites of subdivision (a) of Rule 23 must be satisfied, as well as the predominance and superiority requirements of subdivision (b), the test for satisfying these
elements would, in all likelihood, be less stringent than that demanded under current Rule 23. See id.
One of the Committee's reasons for drafting a settlement class provision was
that a settlement class may surmount choice of law difficulties. See id. at 51. Additionally, the Committee suggested that recognizing certification of a settlement
class would allow one single court to manage the action, whereas multiple courts
would be involved if the issue were litigated. See id. at 52. The Committee also
commented that parties would potentially fare better with settlement classes because settlement
has the advantage of treating alike people who, although similarly
situated, would be treated differently in separate actions. Choice-oflaw, differences in local courts and procedure, problems of proving
individual causation, and the like ensure disparate treatment if class
disposition is not available.
Id. at 36.
Among the concerns voiced by the critics of the proposed amendment was that
a settlement class would convert a class action from a litigation device into a settlement device. See Green, supra note 80, at 1785-86. Opponents argued that settlement classes do not meet the case or controversy requirement of Article III. See id.
at 1791. Opponents to the proposed Rule 23(b) (4) also stated that the proposed
amendment provided "no limiting principles, standards or other guidelines, except
for the basic requirements of 23(a), to help trial judges decide when a settlement
class is desirable and what form the class should take .... " Joint Letter from the
Steering Committee to Oppose Proposed Rule 23 to the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 1, 1996) (on file with the
Seton Hall Law Review). The Steering Committee cautioned that the notes of the
Advisory Committee, the only source that provided necessary restrictions and guidelines, are not binding on the courts. See id. Additionally, opponents believed that
allowing certification solely for settlement purposes could result in collusion by the
parties. See Green, supra note 80, at 1784 (recognizing that the settlement class action device has been considered a weapon "wielded by crusading, power-hungry,
greedy, wealth-redistributing, black-mailing trial lawyers.").
See COMMTTEE ON RULES OF PRACnrCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 18, at 51-52
(commenting that choice of law difficulties may defeat class certification of litigious
classes and that approval of a settlement class under proposed Rule 23(b) (4) could
bypass the choice of law analysis required in litigious disputes). When Rule 23 was
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son for supporting the enactment of a settlement class provision,
however, is also a primary criticism against the use of settlement class
actions." Converting the federal court arena into a forum for
nonadversarial proceedings directly conflicts with the case or controversy requirement of Article III and may actually hamper the judiciadopted in 1966, the Advisory Committee commented that a mass accident was
generally inappropriate for the class action device because significant questions relating to liability and defenses to liability would likely affect individuals differently.
See FED. R. Cirv. P. 23 advisory committee's note. In addition, one of the specific
problems with litigation class actions is that, generally, mass tort defendants prefer
to avoid one nationwide class action suit whose single judgment could ultimately
result in the defendant's downfall and possible bankruptcy. See Arthur Bryant, Class
Actions for Settlement Only: An Invitation to Collusion, LEGAL TIMES, June 17, 1996, at
19. Defendants, however, prefer settling with nationwide classes, especially when a
settlement offer not only pleases the plaintiffs but also favors the defendant. See id.
Further, it seems that federal judges prefer that nationwide mass tort cases be
settled, not litigated. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Agrees to Hear 2 Cases on Asbestos Exposure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1996, at A8. The Agent Orange case gives one
illustration of the burden imposed upon federal courts by mass tort litigation. See
LINDA S. MULLENIx, MASS TORT LITIGATION CASES AND MATERIALS 13 (1996)
(discussing the magnitude of In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 580 F.
Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)). The Agent Orange case consolidated approximately
600 separate tort actions filed by over 15,000 named individuals. See id. These
named parties represented approximately 2.4 million veterans of the Vietnam War,
their spouses, children born and unborn, armed forces personnel from New Zealand and Australia, civilian plaintiffs, corporate defendants, and the government of
the United States. See id. The docket sheet for the case was approximately 425 single-spaced pages comprised of over 7300 individual entries that represented documents in excess of 100 pages. See id. Briefs, hearing transcripts, affidavits, court orders, and other court documents and memoranda were so voluminous that one
entire room, staffed by two specially designated clerks, was devoted to the case. See
id. By May 1984, approximately 1500 law firms represented the plaintiffs. See id. By
1986, the documented cost of the plaintiffs' attorney activities exceeded $10 million. See id. Defendants spent an estimated $100 million solely in preparation for
trial. See id. The district judge presiding over the matter employed additional paralegals and law clerks, and appointed a federal magistrate judge and six special masters to help ease the administrative burden imposed by the litigation. See id.
Settlement classes on the other hand, although at first disfavored by the initial
Manual for Complex Litigation, have been increasingly used for complex mass
torts. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 30.45 (1986); see also, e.g.,
GeneralMotors,55 F.3d at 778. In fact, the Third Circuit, which refused to certify the
General Motors settlement class, acknowledged that settlement class devices have
proven to be extremely valuable tools for disposing of complex and major class actions in a number of substantive areas. See id. These areas include antitrust
(cardboard container and beef industries), medical devices (breast implants,
Dalkon Shield), and toxic torts (Agent Orange, asbestos). See id.
84 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
supra note 18, at 34.
s See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 (extending "judicial Power... to all Cases
[and] ... Controversies"). In order to safeguard "the integrity of the judicial process," the Supreme Court has refused to entertain lawsuits that do not contain an
.actual antagonistic assertion of rights." United States v.Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305
(1943). Respondent's brief in Amchm Products alleged that the settlement and class
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ary's goals of efficiency and resource conservation.' Efficiency may
be thwarted and resources wasted if actions previously brought in
state courts are now brought in the federal system as a settlement
class under Rule 23.
It is likely, however, that valuable time and resources would not
be wasted deciphering applicable choice of law provisions and governing substantive law.8 Proposed Rule 23(b) (4) avoided this problem by limiting certification of settlement classes to parties who have
reached ajudicially approved settlement." Thus, federal court dockets could be cleared of most mass tort cases during an initial phase of
the litigation, and judicial resources might actually be conserved.
III. CREATING FEDERAL CHOICE OF LAW RULES

An alternative solution is the creation of federal choice of law
rules." Although choice of law rules are predominantly the product
certification resulted from collusive efforts. See Brief for Respondent at 11-12, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997) (No. 96-270). The Center for
Claims Resolution (CCR), a conglomerate of 20 companies that manufactured asbestos until 1975, that would ultimately be responsible for any payments of asbestosrelated claims, targeted and approached certain plaintiff attorneys who then became class counsel. See Amthem, 117 S. Ct. at 2238, 2239; Ceorgine, 83 F.3d at 617.
CCR and class counsel then prepared a settlement within the strictures of CCR's
proposed framework. See Brief for Respondent at 12, Amehem (No. 96-270). Upon
reaching a settlement, CCR and class counsel simultaneously filed the complaint
and answer, and made a joint motion for class certification and stipulation of the
settlement. See Amhem, 117 S. Ct. at 2239.
These occurrences support the contention that the Georginecase was settled before the complaint was filed. See Brief for Respondent at 4, Anwhem (No. 96-270).
In fact, no motions, preliminary litigation, or discovery requests of any kind occurred prior to seeking settlement class certification. See id. The Supreme Court,
however, declined to discuss whether a justiciable case or controversy existed between the parties in Amchem because the class certification issues were dispositive.
Se Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2244.
See GeneralMotors,55 F.3d at 799. The Georgine case is an excellent example
of
a mass tort case that is too unmanageable and too big to be tried. See Edward Felsenthal, Court to ConsiderAsbestos Settlement, WAL. ST. J., Nov. 4, 1996, at Bll. The
petitioner in Arahem conceded that the future litigation of the asbestos case was hypothetical and would never occur. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, Amehem (No. 96270); see also Arnhem, 117 S. Ct. at 2239.
See Brief for Respondent at 34 n.25, Amchem (No. 96-270). Unlike the
hundreds of hours associated with defining the substantive law in a mass products liability action, relatively few hours are spent in a settlement class action. See id. According to the 1996 FederalJudicial Center Study, a districtjudge spends approximately
24 minutes on the issue of notice to members of the plaintiff class and 2 hours and
48 minutes considering and ruling on the parties' proposed settlement. See id.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (4) (Proposed Amendment 1996); see also supra
note
19 (discussing the text of the proposed amendment).
SeeScoL.Es &HAY, supra note 10, at5. Choice of lawjurisprudence is primarily
concerned with determining the applicable law when the subject matter of a cause
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of state law,9° it has been recognized that such rules may raise significant constitutional concerns that justify the enactment of a federal
choice of law rule.91 Moreover, because federal courts sitting in diversity are essentially disinterested fora, these courts are in a strategic
and special position to solve the problems associated with interstate
conflicts of law.9 In this regard, state choice of law rules that may
discriminate against out-of-state parties can be overridden by federal
rule."
Either Congress or the federal judiciary could create a federal
choice of law provision." Congress could implement reform by using
its powers under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.!5 Congress is perhaps the better mechanism for reform because the Rules Enabling
Act9 _imposes constraints on the rule-making powers of the federal
judiciary. For example, the Rules Enabling Act limits the federal
of action touches upon the laws of two or more jurisdictions. See id.
See Kane, supra note 20, at 310 (noting that federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction are required to apply the state choice of law rules of the domicile state).
91 See ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 10, at 82-83 nn.3 & 4, 86 n.13, 87 n.16
(illustrating that, even when properly followed, a state's choice of law analysis may
not lead to an application of state law that comports with constitutional requirements of due process).
See RiCHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL Sysrai 699 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (noting
that "allowing the state in which the action happens to be brought to resolve a conflict with another state is like allowing the pitcher to call balls and strikes whenever
he manages to beat the batter to the call." (footnote omitted)).
93 See id.
94 See id. at 697 (recognizing that Congress could create federal
choice of law
rules that are binding on both federal and state courts under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause); Shreve, supra note 27, at 278 (remarking that Congress's blatant inaction in the realm of conflict of laws allows the Supreme Court to occupy partly, or
even wholly, the conflicts field with a "federal common law of conflicts").
95 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedingsshall be proved, and the Effect thereof
Id. (emphasis added); see also HART & WEC.HSLER, supranote 92, at 697 (stating that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause grants to Congress the authority to enact federal
choice of law rules that are binding on both federal and state courts); Mullenix, supra note 21, at 1636 & n.53 (asserting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause provides
constitutional support for the enactment of federal choice of law rules, but commenting that federalized conflicts of law analysis would implicitly recognize that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause trumps the safeguards of state sovereignty in the Tenth
Amendment).
N 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
See id. The Rules Enabling Act provides in pertinent
part:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
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judiciary to promulgating procedural rules.90 Accordingly, because
choice of law rules are traditionally substantive rules of law, any
change should come from Congress."
Deciding whether the legislative or judicial branch should
promulgate a federal choice of law rule, however, only begins the
convoluted and tortuous journey along the path to conflicts of law
reform. Indeed, it is only the first step of several needed to alleviate
the burden imposed on federal courts in complex litigation matters.
In addition to enacting choice of law provisions, federal judges sitting in diversity must also thoroughly understand the substantive law
that will ultimately govern the mass tort action.'00 This additional requirement of choice of law reform strongly supports the implementation of federal substantive tort law as opposed to merely federal
choice of law rules. 0 '
The initial task of drafting a choice of law rule also creates complications that could override the efficiency of any such rule. 02 Prior
to drafting federal choice of law rules, several issues must be resolved. The following is a brief, albeit nonexhaustive, list of potential problems that may arise even before a federal choice of law rule
is drafted. First, it must be determined whether the choice of law
rule applies only to complex, multiparty, multistate actions brought
in federal court, or whether the rule also applies to actions brought
in state courts.'0 3 Second, if the federal choice of law rule applies
solely to products liability actions or other forms of complex litigation, then an arbitrary line is drawn between the different types of

United States district courts (including proceedings before magis-

trates thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive

right.
Id.

98 See id.
99 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941)
(finding
that choice of law analysis affects substantive rights); Kramer, supra note 10, at 56972 (explaining why choice of law is a substantive issue).

100 See Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and

PracticalAdvantages of the State Forum Over the FederalForum in Mass Tort Cases, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215, 217 (1994) (commenting that state courtjudges are ex-

perts in state law whereas federal courtjudges are better suited for interpreting constitutional law and federal statutory provisions).
101See infra notes 127-67 (discussing reform in the context of federal substantive
law).
102 See Mullenix, supranote 21, at 1625 (commenting that choice of lawjurisprudence is a discipline "mired in sophistry and obfuscation").
103See id. at 1646-47.
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diversity actions brought in federal courts.'0 Lastly, it must be determined whether the federal choice of law rule will merely guide
federal judges towards a particular state's choice of law analysis, or
whether it will point towards a particular state's substantive law.'"5 If
the rule directs federal judges sitting in diversity towards a particular
kind of analysis, then in essence, the rule leads only to another
Sisyphian Hill'" that must be overcome. If, however, the federal
choice of law rule mandates the utilization of a particular type of
substantive law, then perhaps the better solution is the enactment of
federal substantive law.
In addition to the categorical problems that arise when drafting
a federal choice of law rule, a myriad of practical problems accompany the initial structuring of the regulation. For instance, the
choice of law rule must comport with constitutional due process requirements.' 07 The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,'0 8 addressed the due process limitations on a
state's choice of law rules.'09 In Phillips Petroleum, the Court discussed
the propriety of a state choosing its own law as the governing law in a
class action suit."0 The Court commented that a plaintiff must have
enough significant contacts with the state whose substantive law will
be applied so that the choice of that state's substantive law is neither
arbitrary nor unfair, and thus, complies with the Due Process
Clause."'
Another problem presented by a uniform, generally applicable
choice of law provision imposed upon both federal and state courts
is that such a rule may run afoul of deeply rooted concepts of federalism and state sovereignty." 2 A generally applicable choice of law
104 See id. at 1641-44.
105

Cf. ScoIis & HAY, supra note 10, at 67-72 (discussing "whether the reference

to the foreign law also encompasses choice-of-law rules of thatjurisdiction.").
106 See MARK P.O. MoRaoRD & ROBERTJ. LENARWON, CLASSICAL MV-HOLo)GY 302-03
(4th ed. 1991) (recounting the myth of Sisyphus, who was condemned to pushing a
boulder up a hill only to have it roll back down just as he reached the hill's crest).
S07
ee Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985).

108 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
109 See id. at 818,
821.
110 See id. at 799.

i

See id. at 816, 818.
See U.S. CoNsr. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
Id.; see also Robert A. Sedler, The Complex Litigation roject's Proposalfor Federally- Man1
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rule may be authorized under the Full Faith and Credit Clause... and
enforceable by way of the Supremacy Clause.114 Requiring adherence
to the rule by state courts adjudicating mass tort cases, however, may
conflict with the rights of state sovereignty safeguarded by the Tenth
Amendment."5
An alternative choice of law regulation could be a provision that
applies only to mass tort and products liability actions brought in
federal court. This proposed remedy, however, arguably constitutes
a violation of the Eriedoctrine."6 Furthermore, such a remedy would
likely result in forum shopping."7 Forum shopping may occur because plaintiffs who reside in a state with less favorable choice of law
rules would opt for a federal forum and its rules.""
Lastly, although uniform choice of law rules and analysis would
arguably be achieved by a federal choice of law rule, a uniform and
predictable choice of law may not ultimately result." 9 This is so bedated Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases: Another Assault on State Sovereignty, 54 LA. L.
REv. 1085, 1086 (1994) (remarking that a federally imposed choice of law rule violates state sovereignty principles that lie at the very heart of this nation's federal system).
113See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also supra note 95.
14 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause states in pertinent
part:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
115 See Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing
Federal Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MAQ. L. REv. 76, 82-95
(1989) (noting that federal choice of law rules applicable to state court actions disregard the power and the sovereignty of states to enact choice of law rules that will
govern disputes between parties in its courts).
16
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that Congress
lacks the authority "to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State
whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part
of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts.").
1
See generally Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276
U.S. 518 (1928) and Mullenix, supra note 21, at 1645-49, 1657 for a discussion of
the evils of forum shopping.
1s Cf Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 523. The petitioner in Black & White
Taxicab alleged that respondent deliberately and fraudulently reincorporated in
Tennessee in order to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction and evade Kentucky contract laws. See id.
19 See Mullenix, supra note 3, at 784-85. Under a state's choice of law rules, the
substantive law of 50 states may govern the class action lawsuit. See id. at 785. This
is especially true where mass tort cases are comprised of individual lawsuits initially
dispersed in all 50 states and the governing state choice of law analysis directs the
judge to apply the substantive law of multiple states. See id.
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cause the choice of law analysis may direct the federal judge sitting in
diversity to a particular state's choice of law rules. That state's choice
of law analysis may require the applicability of the substantive tort
law of numerous states. 20 Because state law variations may defeat the
commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23, the potential

applicability of the substantive law of fifty different states to one class
action lawsuit logically increases the likelihood of class decertification. 2 1 Once decertification is ordered, it naturally follows that the
nationwide class action suit is defeated. A Castano-like situation may
then arise because the nationwide mass tort action, rather than dying, merely resurfaces in another form." This is not an efficient
method for resolving nationwide mass tort cases. Federal judicial re-

sources are wasted, and state court dockets become burdened with
the same litigation that was originally brought in federal court.
If, on the other hand, choice of law regulation is structured so
that one state's substantive law governs a nationwide mass tort ac-

tion, then at least two potential problems are encountered. First, the
application of a single state's substantive laws is inconsistent with the
characteristics of a nationwide mass tort action.
Second, the law
must comport with constitutional due process requirements.' 4
Given these obstacles, the viability of choosing one state's substantive

See Kramer, supra note 10, at 582 & n.130, 584 (noting that an "honest" choice
of law analysis could result in the applicability of various laws to one action).
1
See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741, 752 (5th Cir.
12

1996) (ordering the dismissal of a class action suit because variations in state tort
laws overwhelmed any predominance and commonality of fact).
12 See Anthony Flint, Court Derails Class Action Tobacco Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, May
24, 1996, at 1 (noting that the decertification of the Castano plaintiff class will
"create a large number of 'son of Castano' suits in individual states"); Myron Levin,
As Tobacco Litigation Goes, Castano is Super Bowl, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at Al
(quoting comments by the Castanoattorneys that the plaintiffs "will flood the courthouses of the United States with individual claims" in light of the decision that they
cannot bring nationwide class action suits); Tobacco Litigation Continues Apace, FIN.
TIMs, Aug. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File (noting that after the Castano decertification decision, suits were filed in the District of Columbia
and the state courts of California, Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, and New
York).
123 See Kramer, supra note 10, at 578-79 (commenting "that the
more 'national'
the case, the less appropriate it is for any single state's standard to govern" and suggesting that the application of one state's law to a national action is an inappropriate solution because that state's law "reflects the political judgment of only a fraction of the nation.").
124 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985) (holding
that
unless there exists "a 'significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts'"
with Kansas, application of Kansas law would be arbitrary and unfair to plaintiff class
members) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
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law as the governing law in a nationwide mass tort action is implausible.
Ultimately, a federal choice of law provision affects the substan25
tive rights of the parties involved in nationwide mass tort litigation.'
Therefore, the enactment of a federal choice of law rule is a "backdoor" method for the creation of federal mass tort law.'
As such,
the better solution may be to create federal mass tort law. Creating
federal mass tort or products liability law converts this type of complex litigation into a federal question, ends the needless tap dancing
required by other proposed reform methods, and provides a direct
and workable solution to the problems created by nationwide mass
tort actions.
IV. FEDERALIZING MASS TORT SUBSTANTiVE LAW

The most direct method for resolving the complexities associated with mass tort litigation is the creation of federal substantive
mass tort law applicable to all mass tort actions, whether brought in
state or federal court.27' Federal mass tort or products liability law
could be established in two ways: (1) by the judiciary as common
law,1 28 or (2) by Congress as federal legislation.'" The Commerce

125

See Kramer, supra note 10, at 569, 570, 571 (asserting that choice of law is

surely substantive). Professor Kramer argues that choice of law analysis is substantive because it assigns rights to the parties involved in litigation and defines the
elements of claims and defenses. See id. at 569, 570. Professor Kramer concludes
that because choice of law analysis determines parties' rights, choice of law is the
gvery
paradigm of what we mean by 'substantive.'" Id. at 572.
See Mullenix, supra note 3, at 760 n.20 (commenting that "in an oddly elliptical way, the proposals to federalize applicable law in mass tort cases seem almost a
back-door method of federalizing substantive mass tort law.").
127 See Friedrich K. Juenger, Complex Litigation Project's Tort
Choice of Law Ruks, 54
LA. L. REv. 907, 907 (1994) (noting that the Reports to the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project recognized that substantive law issues of mass tort
cases could most directly be resolved by adopting uniform national standards).
128 See Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 1017
n.44 (1996) (setting forth several definitions of federal common law). For purposes
of this Note, "federal substantive law" and "general federal common law" refer to
judicial decisions that do not result from the interpretation of an existing federal
statute or federal text. These phrases do not refer to procedural matters.
Professor Juenger proposed a version of substantive federal common law specifically for interstate or international mass torts. See Kozyris, supra note 20, at 955
(describing Professor Juenger's proposal for substantive common law as creating a
"new ijus gentium' [that incorporates] the best and most modem tort standard....."). See generally FRiEDRiH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE
JUSTICE 192-99 (1993) (proposing a model for substantive federal common law);
Friedrich KJuenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict ofLaws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 105
(1989) (proposing the same).
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Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States."'
Congress, therefore, would
have the power to enact such legislation because complex litigation
is multistate.'" The federal tort law could mirror the way Congress
enacted the federal securities law.
Like products liability actions,
securities claims were originally subject only to the protections offered by the laws of individual states. 3" Additionally, in the same
manner in which Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act,'M which addressed class action suits in the securities
context, 135 Congress could pass legislation specifically directed at
streamlining mass tort class action cases.
If general federal substantive mass tort law is statutorily created,
Congress could incorporate substantive legal standards, statutes of
limitations, jurisdictional provisions, and legal remedies.'3 Such legislation, however, might receive unfavorable treatment by the Supreme Court. The recent Supreme Court decisions in Seminole Tribe
v. Hrida,'7 United States v. Lopez, M and New York v. United State 39 ilCf MARC I. STEINBERG, SEcURITIES REGULATION 1-2 (1993) (describing the development of federal securities laws).
IT U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
1 See Kane, supra note 20, at 312. Congressional regulation of complex litigation
1

is permitted because complex litigation embraces "cases dispersed in multiple forums across state lines and involving underlying activity or conduct that either is
multistate in character or has multistate effects." Id.
1
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).
13 See STEINBERG, supra note 129, at 2. The state securities statutes commonly referred to as "blue sky" laws were primarily designed to prevent investors from being
enticed into "'speculative schemes which ha[d] no more basis than so many feet of
blue sky.'" Id. (quoting Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917)).
Twenty-two years after the first blue sky law was passed in Kansas, the first federal securities law was enacted. See id. at 1, 3. The Securities Act of 1933, which
regulates the initial distribution of securities, was almost immediately followed by
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See id. at 1. The Exchange Act regulates trading in the secondary markets. See id. The aim of these laws is to provide investors
with as accurate and complete information as possible so that the investors can
make fully informed decisions. See id. at 3. In order to enforce the federal securities laws, the government created The Securities and Exchange Commission in
1934. Seeid. at 2.
13
15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1 (West 1997). Recognizing a need for reform in federal
securities litigation, the 104th Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which amended Tide I of the Securities Act of 1933. See id. The
Act provides, among other things, procedural and liability standards and guidelines
for securities fraud class action suits brought pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See id.; see also supra note 25 (discussing the Act).
13 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1.
6 See Mullenix, supra note 21, at
1632.
1
116S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
138 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
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lustrate the reluctance of the Court to uphold congressional action
Additionally, individual
that encroaches upon state sovereignty.'
4
1
supporters of states' rights oppose congressional tort reform.1
The judiciary could create federal substantive mass tort law, but
in so doing, the courts may violate the long established Erie doctrine,
denouncing general federal common law.'42 Though well-settled,
strict adherence to this principle has been lacking.4 4 The dormant
commerce clause, for example, is essentially judicially created federal
common law.'" Moreover, the Supreme Court has occasionally allowed judicially formulated federal law, which governs certain diversity cases, to displace state law. 45 Additionally, the Erie doctrine does
not preclude the judicial creation of federal common law for interstate cases.1 In fact, there exists a strong argument that the federal
courts have an implied constitutional power to create general federal
common law whenever the interest at stake is national in scope.147

"9 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
140 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133 (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity applied and prevented suit against the State of Florida even though a congressional statute authorized the suit); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (holding that the federally enacted Gun Free School Zone Act overstepped the powers granted to
Congress under the Commerce Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 149
(stating that the federal government could not enact legislation that compelled
states to regulate in a particular manner).
1
See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 917. Indeed, it has been suggested that tort law
is state law and the creation of federal substantive tort law is a step towards centralization. See id.
142 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (stating that the Constitution does not confer upon federal courts the power to create substantive common
law applicable to actions predicated on state law).
143 See generally Weinberg, supra note 26, at 805, 812-19, 832-42 (suggesting that,
despite the Supreme Court's statement in Eie that the federal judiciary is prohibited from making general federal common law, federal courts have recognized and
legtimized some forms of federal common law).
See Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution,JudicialActivism, the Dormant
Commerce Clause and the FederalismMantra, 71 OR. L. REv. 409, 420 (1992) (noting
that some legal scholars argue that judicially created constitutional common law, as
typified by the dormant commerce clause, "has survived the demise of the more
'general' federal common law interred" by Erie). The dormant Commerce Clause
cannot be found in explicit textual language of the United States Constitution but
is a negative implication of the Commerce Clause that emerged from judicial interpretation. See generaly IuiEcE H. TRIBE, CONsTrirIoNAL LAw §§ 6-3 to 6-15, at
404-42 (2d ed. 1988).
145 See Lund, supra note 128, at 916 n.67.
146 SeeJuenger, supra note 127, at 922.
'.1 See Weinberg, supra note 26, at 813. Professor Weinberg argues that federal
courts have the power to create general federal common law when dealing with issues of national interest. See id.
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During the 1990s, however, the Supreme Court has restricted
the power of federal courts to make federal law."
Further, even
prior to this restriction, the federal courts were reluctant to invoke
their own versions of the law on issues traditionally governed by state
law." 9 Therefore, the likelihood that the federal courts will embark
on a reform of mass tort litigation by creating a general federal
common law is virtually nil."
As such, congressionally enacted federal substantive law is not
only the most logical answer, but is expressly authorized by the
Commerce Clause'' for purposes of mass tort actions, particularly
products liability actions, involving products that have crossed state
boundaries., 2 Using its powers under Article I to regulate interstate
commerce, Congress could enact legislation that directly addresses
substantive law problems encountered when litigating mass tort actions.'53 This legislation would encompass almost all products that
have been the center of litigious disputes during the past several
years.'" Constructing federal substantive mass tort law would not be
as daunting a task as drafting federal choice of law rules applicable to
i 5 could be utilized as
mass torts. Indeed, the Restatement of Torts'
a
See Lund, supra note 128, at 899. The Supreme Court has restricted federal
common law making power by (1) holding that state law, not federal common law,
governs issues that originally were the province of federal common law; and (2) requiring the federal judiciary to incorporate state law when federal common law is
dispositive. See id.
See Shreve, supra note 27, at 281 n.67.
150 See id.
1
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States." Id.
SSee Kane, supra note 20, at 312. In fact, Congress has already passed the
equivalent of substantive tort law. See, e.g., The Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994); The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1994). Additionally, in 1908, Congress recognized the
need to regulate tort claims brought by railroad employees against their employers
and enacted the Federal Employers' Liability Act. See Schwartz, supra note 67, at
920.
1
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congressional regulation of complex litigation is permitted because complex litigation embraces "cases dispersed in multiple
forums across state lines and involving underlying activity or conduct that either is
multistate in character or has multistate effects." Kane, supranote 20, at 312.
15 See generally Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231
(1997)
(asbestos); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996)
(tobacco); In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (penile implants); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995) (automobiles); In re RhonePoulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995)
(blood products).
1 REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1965). In fact,
as of 1986, only six
148
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guideline, or the proposed Restatement of Products Liability'5 could
be codified by Congress.
The need for a uniform tort law is accute because if the products are distributed nationwide manufacturers are currently subject
to the different products liability rules of fifty jurisdictions.' 7 The
benefit of a federally imposed substantive tort law is best supported
by the fact that technological advances in manufacturing and transportation have resulted in the design and manufacture of many
mass-produced products being conducted and managed at national
and regional levels.'58 Further, distribution of these products is no

longer limited to local, state specific areas.'59 Rather, standardized

transactions often reach across state borders.'60 Consequently, the
previously held assumption that tort actions are generally local in nature, as opposed to nationwide or federal, is outdated. 6 Whereas
local state laws were once used to resolve local disputes, local state
laws are now applied to occurrences and transactions that reach national levels. 62 Moreover, the United States is perhaps the only
country in the world that has relegated the creation of tort law to
each individual state. 6 Congress, however, has not adopted a unified approach for federalizing mass tort substantive law6 and it does

jurisdictions had not adopted the Restatement of Torts § 402A, the strict liability provision. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE. LAW OF TORTS § 30, at
694 n.11.5 (Supp. 1988).
RESTATEMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY§

12 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).

See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 924. For example, in products liability cases,
some states determine liability for design defect based solely on consumer expectations. See id. at 928. Further, some states do not admit evidence of a manufacturer's
subsequent design in products liability actions, while other jurisdictions do allow
the admission of this evidence. See id. at 928 & n.67.
5See
Kozyris, supra note 20, at 953.
161

See id.
See id.
See id.

162

See id.

159

160

See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 921. Tort law is national law in both India and
Switzerland. See id. Although tort law in Canada and Australia is created by the
courts of each province or state, the national supreme court ultimately resolves any
disputes that arise. See id. The European Community has converted tort law to a
supra-national level. See id. at 924.
64 See Kramer, supra note 10, at 550; Schwartz, supra note
67, at 917 (noting that
in March 1995, the House of Representatives passed a tort reform bill that was narrowed by the Senate in April 1995 and ultimately vetoed by President Clinton in
May 1996); see also Anthony Lewis, Make Haste Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at
A17 (commenting that state law has governed the law of torts for 200 years).
163
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not appear that Congress will embrace this theory in the near future.
Although legal scholars, the courts, and the American Law Institute have summarily dismissed the possibility of federalized substantive mass tort law as a solution to the problem of complex mass tort
litigation, it is a viable solution to the mass tort dilemma that
plagues our court system. In fact, Congress has already taken steps
toward nationalizing products liability law. 167 Congress should therefore continue these steps and develop a workable solution to mass
tort litigation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Nationwide mass tort actions put the "complex" in the phrase
"complex litigation." Methods for effectively dealing with mass tort
actions in the federal forum have been forefront in the minds of legal scholars, judges, attorneys, and politicians. No proposed solution, however, has been widely adopted. A generally applicable federal substantive law such as that devised for securities regulation and
food and drug regulation would most efficiently deal with mass tort
actions. Further, allowing mass tort claimants access to the federal
court system via federal question jurisdiction would not overburden
the federal dockets. Rather, the total number of mass tort actions in
the federal system would remain the same because of the de facto
federalization of mass tort litigation. 16 Consequently, mass tort litigation cases would merely shift from diversity to federal question jurisdiction. In all likelihood, however, the enactment of such a resolution will probably not occur in the immediate future. An
alternative and viable method of reform that will be more easily accepted must therefore be pursued.
An express acknowledgment of settlement classes, like the Advisory Committee's proposed settlement class amendment to Rule 23,
Se Shreve, supra note 27, at 281 n.67 (citing to commentary by the American
Law Institute that the chances of political consensus on appropriate federal substantive law for mass tort litigation are slim, and further, that it is unlikely Congress will
intrude upon areas traditionally governed by state law); see alsoJuenger, supra note
127, at 907.
166 See Symeon C. Symeonides, The A.L.L 's Complex Litigation Project: Commencing
the National Debate, 54 LA. L. REv. 843, 855 (1994) (suggesting that congressional
enactment of federal mass tort law is an utopian theory).
167 See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 917 (observing that both the House of Representatives and the Senate attempted to enact a tort reform bill that included provisions pertaining to products liability actions).
I" See Mullenix, supranote 3, at 786.
1
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is probably the best alternative to a national federal tort law. In fact,
the United States Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor169 praised the concept of the settlement class but noted that under
the present language of Rule 23, the proposed settlement is only one
factor in considering the propriety of class certification.'
A settlement class amendment to Rule 23 would permit settlement to be the
predominant factor, rather than merely one factor, in the certification analysis. Once the class is certified, the settlement can be approved, and the case for all practical purposes is over. Therefore, an
express settlement class provision would allow the federal courts to
dispense with the litigation at an early stage of the proceedings and
would conserve precious judicial resources.
In conclusion, implementation of any of the foregoing proposals would enable an efficient use of existing judicial resources.
Therefore, Congress, the judiciary, or both should vigorously endorse the adoption of any one of the above proposals for effectively
handling the mass tort litigation phenomenon that has invaded the
federal forum.
Pamela M. Madas

169

170

117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
See id. at 2248.

